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court.96 The majority in a per curiam opinion merely restated the holdings
arrived at below.
The dissenting opinion, however, vigorously attacked the majority view
that the Legislature has the power to vest the Magistrates' Courts of the City
of New York with power to try misdemeanors. They argued that if the added
language in 1925 (i.e., "inferior local courts of similar character") was meant
to extend power to the Legislature to grant jurisdiction to Magistrates' Courts,
it would only have been necessary to add "inferior local courts." The Magis-
trates' interpretation would render the words "of similar character" mere
surplusage which could not have been the intention of the Legislature. Thus
the dissent concludes that the words "of similar character" refer to courts
which function outside New York having similar or equivalent jurisdiction
to the Courts of Special Sessions. Given this interpretation, the State Consti-
tution did not vest the Legislature with authority to enact Section 102 of the
Defense Emergency Act.97 As a result the dissent urges, as did defendants
below, that the only way that a Magistrates' Court can obtain jurisdiction to
try a misdemeanor is as provided in Section 131 of the New York City
Criminal Courts Act,98 which as previously stated, in effect, requires the con-
sent of the defendant.
It appears that the purpose of the Act is to meet the dangerous prob-
lems that are ever present from the threat of enemy attack, especially from
atomic raids. In passing such an act the Legislature realized that such dangers
and problems must be met with the "least possible interference with the
existing division of the powers of the government and the least possible in-
fringement of the liberties of the people, including the freedom of speech, press
and assembly. ' 9
COUNTY LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE IX, SECTION 5 OF STATE CONSTITUTION
Article IX, Section 5 of the New York State Constitution provides in
part that the office of Sheriff will be an elective office. It further provides,
"But the county shall never be made responsible for the acts of the sheriff."'
The immunity clause was first constructed by the court in WolJe v. Super-
visors of Richmond County.2 The case involved an action under a statue mak-
ing a city or county liable for damage caused by a mob or riot.3 The question
was whether the statute violated Article IX, Section 5. It was held that it
96. Supra note 86.
97. Supra note 89.
98. Supra note 91.
99. N.Y. Defense Emergency Act § 2.
1. This immunity clause has been in the Constitution since 1821, and proposed
amendments in both 1867 and 1938 failed to remove it. Convention Proceedings and
Debates 1867-1868, Vol. I, 924-926; revised Record, N.Y. State Const. Convention, 1938,
Vol. I, 237, 1017, 2541.
2. 19 How. Prac. 370 (Sup. Ct. 1860).
3. Then L. 1855, ch. 428, now N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law, § 71.
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did not. The clause was construed as follows, "The true construction of this
clause is, that for anything done by the sheriff in the discharge of his official
duties, the county shall not be liable." 4
Subsequent to that decision the lower courts construed Article LK, Sec-
tion 5 as holding the county immune from liability for the negligent acts of
the sheriff or his deputies committed in the course of their official duties. For
example, Thomas v. Ontario County5 was an action to recover damages to
plaintiff's airplane caused by the alleged negligence of a deputy sheriff, who
had hired the plane to perform his official duties. In granting the motion by
the county to dismiss the complaint, the court said: "Section 5 of Article 9...
provide...: ... 'But the county shall never be made responsible for the acts
of the sheriff.' (Italics are mine)" and "If a county could be held responsible
for the acts of the deputy sheriffs and cannot be held responsible for the acts
of the sheriff as provided by the State Constitution, that provision of the State
Constitution would be of little effect since the sheriff by necessity must act
through his deputies in most instances." 6
In the principal case, Commisso v. Meeker,1 defendant Zambon, a Deputy
Sheriff of Oneida County, had just apprehended a speeding motorist and
parked his patrol car partly on the south shoulder of a three lane highway.
Subsequently, the cars of defendants Mastrangelo, in which the plaintiff was
a passenger, and Meeker approached from opposite directions. Both testified
that they noticed the red flashing light on the county car. As Mastrangelo
approached the county car, he turned to the left. At about the same time
Meeker was allegedly attempting to pass a car. As a result both cars met head
on in the middle lane.
This appeal is from the Appellate Division's affirmance8 of the trial court's
judgment that the three above defendants and the County of Oneida were
negligent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment as to defendants
Meeker, Mastrangelo and Zambon and reversed as to defendant County of
Oneida
Judge Froessel's opinion traces the constitutional history and the history
of the court's interpretation of the county immunity clause and concludes:
"It thus appears that the compelling mandate of the constitutional provision
is crystal dear, stating in the plainest language that 'the county shall never be
made responsible for the acts of the sheriff.' (Emphasis supplied.)"' 0
Chief Judge Desmond, in his dissent, takes the position that the consti-
tutional provision protects the county, "from the historic, conventional duties
4. Supra note 2 at 373.
5. 187 Misc. 711, 65 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
6. Id. at 712, 65 N.Y.S.2d 258.
7. 8 N.Y.2d 109, 202 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1960).
8. 9 A.D2d 865, 193 N.Y.S.2d 112 (4th Dep't 1959).
9. Supra note 7. The issue of insufficiency of evidence will be considered only so
far as it bears on the issue of the constitutional immunity of defendant, County of Oneida.
10. Id. at 121,.202 N.Y.S.2d. 292.
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of the centuries-old office of Sheriff,""1 and concludes that, "Such a provision
has nothing whatever to do with the negligent handling of a county-owned
automobile which happens to be driven by a county employee paid by the
county but carrying the title of 'deputy sheriff.' "12
It should be noted that two judges, Van Voorhis and Foster, concurred
with Judge Froessel's opinion, and that two judges concurred with Chief Judge
Desmond in his dissenting opinion. The seventh, Judge Dye, concurs only in
the result as to the county upon the ground that the evidence is insufficient as
a matter of law to establish the negligence of the deputy. It is questionable
whether Judges Van Voorhis and Foster should have concurred in Judge
Froessel's holding as to the constitutional issue, since in their dissenting opinion
they voted to reverse as to the deputy because of insufficient evidence. Thus,
they were not required to pass on the constitutional liability of the county.
However, this case does illustrate that the Court is evenly divided in their
interpretation of the county immunity clause.
In view of the constitutional history and the lower court's seemingly con-
sistent holdings as to the immunity of the county for the acts of a sheriff or
his deputies,13 it would appear that a great deal of reliance has been put on this
interpretation of Article IX, Section 5. Judge Froessel seems to state the wisest
course to follow when he says, "to hold the county liable in this case for the
acts of the Sheriff would require us to cast aside the mandate of the Consti-
tution and shift the liability from the surety to the county, which the Consti-
tution directs shall never be responsible. This may not be done without re-
course to a constitutional amendment."-4
EXISTING E=RGE~cy RENT CONTOLS JUSTFIED
In the matter of Lincoln Building Associates v. ame,' 5 the petitioner
landlord challenged the constitutionality of the 1959 re-enactment and ex-
tension'8 of the Emergency Business Rent Control Law.17 Petitioner claimed
the statutes violated the due process clauses of the federal and state Consti-
tutions' 8 and the federal obligation of contracts clause,' 9 in that the emergency
upon which the statute was enacted no longer existed and hence the action of
11. Id. at 124, 202 N.Y.S2d 295.
12. Ibid.
13. Iserean v. Stone, 3 A.D.2d 247, 160 N.Y..2d 336 (4th Dept 1957); Hawkins v.
Dominy, 18 Misc. 2d 221, 185 N.Y.S.2d 310 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Schnitzer v. County of Erie,
8 Misc. 2d 989, 168 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Mentillo v. County of Cayuga, 2
Misc. 2d 820, 150 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
14. Supra note 7 at 123, 202 N.Y.S2d 294 (1960).
15. 8 N.Y.2d 179, 203 N.Z.S.2d 86 (1960).
16. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 809.
17. Ibid. It should be noted that the Emergency Business Rent Control Law is
applicable only in cities of the state having a population of more than one million, thus
only affecting New York City.
18. N.Y. Const. Art. 1, §§ 6, 11; US. Const. Amend. XIV.
19. U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 10.
